Roy Cooper Drove 100 Million in Hurricane Aid to Affordable Housing Despite Victims Still in Temporary Homes

Roy Cooper Redirected $100 Million Hurricane Aid to Affordable Housing

Hundreds of North Carolina hurricane victims were still living in temporary housing when then Governor Roy Cooper directed about $100 million in disaster relief funding toward affordable housing projects, according to an analysis by the John Locke Foundation.

The finding raises a basic question about disaster recovery: when federal and state relief money arrives after a storm, should it first make victims whole, or can it also fund broader housing goals?

The answer is that affordable housing can be part of rebuilding. But in this case, Cooper put long-term housing development ahead of storm victims who were still waiting for permanent repairs or replacement homes.

Governor Roy Cooper declined to comment on the analysis.

The John Locke Foundation, a free-market think tank based in North Carolina, analyzed spending by the Cooper Administration after two major hurricanes. Its central claim is direct: Cooper’s administration sent about $100 million in disaster money to affordable housing projects while the administration faced a large budget shortfall and many storm victims remained in temporary homes.

For storm victims, recovery does not mean a ribbon-cutting for a new apartment complex miles away. It means getting back into a safe home. It means leaving temporary housing. It means knowing whether their damaged house will be repaired, elevated, bought out, or replaced.

Cooper's Administration argued that hurricanes worsen housing shortages justifing the move of approximately $100 million dollars to affordable projects to reduce pressure on displaced families and low-income residents.

However, if people directly hit by disasters are still in temporary housing, the state’s first duty is to finish those cases before funding projects that serve a broader population.

The controversy did not unfold in a vacuum. Cooper's Administration was overseeing a recovery portfolio worth about $1 billion, according to the analysis, while also dealing with a major budget shortfall.

A shortfall in a disaster recovery agency is not a minor bookkeeping issue. It affects how fast homes are repaired, how many projects move forward, and whether the state must seek more money from lawmakers or shift funds between priorities.

When a recovery agency does not have enough money, every spending choice must come under sharper scrutiny.

That is especially true when the spending is not tied directly to individual storm victims. Affordable housing may be a valid recovery use under certain grant rules, but validity and priority are different questions.

The key criticism is not simply that Cooper directed his administration to fund affordable housing using money earmarked for hurricane disaster victims. It is that Cooper did so while:

• Hundreds of storm victims were still in temporary homes

• A large funding gap already existed

• The state had not fully resolved long-running recovery delays

  
  

This is where public trust breaks down. Disaster relief programs depend on a clear promise: money set aside after a catastrophe will help the people and communities damaged by that catastrophe. If the public believes the money was redirected toward broader policy goals, confidence suffers.

One project cited in the analysis is Starway Village, a 278-unit affordable housing complex that received about $9 million. On its own, a 278-unit affordable housing development may sound like a practical response to a housing shortage. However, it is not the answer to assisting victims of the hurricane to repair or rebuild their homes at the existing site, not twelve to twenty miles away.

According to the analysis, Starway Village and other projects funded through the program did not require applicants to be hurricane victims. That detail matters because it changes how the public understands the spending.

If disaster money builds housing only for displaced storm victims, the connection is obvious. If the same money is redirected to affordable housing open to a wider group of income-qualified applicants who were not affected by the hurricane, then the connection becomes broader and more debatable.

Cooper and his administration argue that community recovery includes replacing lost rental units, stabilizing local housing markets, and assisting low-income residents. However, those projects and goals must not come before finishing repairs for named, eligible victims already in the recovery pipeline.

In North Carolina, the frustration grew because some storm victims were still waiting while affordable housing projects moved ahead. To them, agency explanations about program categories and eligible uses sound distant from the reality of living in a temporary unit.

If the Cooper Administration had a large shortfall, and if victims remained in temporary housing, why were affordable housing projects funded at that scale?

Although Cooper’s position was that the affordable housing spending served recovery goals without delaying help for storm victims, but the John Locke Foundation’s analysis found otherwise. Their analysis reported that the spending of the $100 million in disaster relief funding reflected misplaced priorities at a time when the Cooper Administration was already under pressure due to large funding shortfall for other projects unrelated to the hurricane disaster relief funding received.

The public record described in the analysis leaves several questions that matter beyond partisan debate:

• How many storm victims were still in temporary housing when these awards moved forward?

• What funding rules governed the $100 million used for affordable housing?

• Could any of that money have been redirected to direct victim assistance?

• How did the Cooper Administration rank affordable housing against unfinished home repairs or replacement?

• What safeguards ensured disaster victims were not pushed behind broader housing programs?

  
  

Those questions require transparency because disaster recovery depends on public confidence.

Roy Cooper, a Democrat who served as North Carolina's governor during the period at issue, and is currently running for the North Carolina Senate seat against Republican Michael Whatley, oversaw the state government responsible for the appropriate distribution of that hurricane disaster money. The analysis indicates that the decision to reallocate disaster relief money to affordable housing spending as a decision made under his watch.

Cooper declined to comment, according to the brief. That leaves their only defense as the state’s main response: the affordable housing program did not harm recovery for storm victims.

For many residents still suffering from the lose of their homes, the legal or administrative answer does not settle the matter. Recovery is judged by outcomes, not only by compliance.

If a family spends years in temporary housing, the system has failed them in a practical sense, even if every form was processed under the right rule. If an agency spends large sums on projects that do not require applicants to be storm victims, it should be ready to explain why that choice served the disaster mission.

The controversy also shows how affordable housing can become politically exposed when it is funded through emergency recovery programs.

Affordable housing may have strong public support in many communities when the need is clear. But disaster money carries a different public expectation. People expect it to follow the damage. They expect victims to come first. When that link feels weak, even useful housing projects can become symbols of government drift.

That is the core issue in the Roy Cooper hurricane aid controversy. The question is not whether affordable housing matters. It does. The question is whether Cooper and his administration's disaster recovery officials made the right call while storm victims were still waiting for permanent homes.

The debate over Cooper’s spending should push government officials to make recovery priorities clearer before the next disaster, not after money has already been committed.

Roy Cooper should have separated direct victim assistance from broader community rebuilding in a way the public can understand. If money is reserved for homeowners directly affected by the hurricane, say so. If money is reserved for rental housing or affordable developments, explain why and explain who can live there.

Disaster recovery money must be traceable to disaster recovery results. Affordable housing may be part of that work, but when hundreds of victims remain in temporary homes, state leaders owe the public a clear explanation of priorities, trade-offs, and outcomes.

Solution: Elect Republican Senate candidate Michael Whatley to ensure transparency and accountability and end the funding by the Democrat's on socialist programs such as affordable housing.

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